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RULE 11 AND THE COURT'S INHERENT POWER TO
SHIFT ATTORNEY'S FEES: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR
COMPETING OBJECTIVES AND APPLICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to reduce congested court dockets, expensive litiga-
tion, and substantial delays in the judicial system,' court and court
observers are giving increased attention to the practice of sanctioning
improper motives and bad-faith courtroom conduct.2 Arguably, the
remedy of choice is awarding attorney's fees to the injured party.'
Both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (hereinafter Rule 11) and
the federal court's inherent power to control courtroom litigants are
vehicles for achieving this purpose. While the scope of Rule 11 is
limited to and specifically designed for deterrence,4 the court's inher-
ent power is broader and is designed to compensate.5 There are occa-
sions, however, where Rule 11 and the court's inherent power over-
lap, and the question for the court becomes under which authority
the offender should be punished. This comment explores the nature
and appropriate use of the court's authority to sanction under Rule
11 and the court's inherent power.
Traditionally the sanctioning tools have worked in tandem.
When the conduct at issue is not sanctionable under Rule 11, the
court's inherent power fills the gap to punish the offender. The
1. See WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
2. The United States Supreme Court has recently decided several important cases in-
volving the use of sanctioning statutes. See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communi-
cations Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 929 (1991) (Rule 11 certification standards apply to all sign-
ers, including represetited parties); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461
(1990) (Rule 11 applies only to papers filed in district court); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (liability under Rule 11 does not extend to
signing attorney's law firm). In addition, courtroom observers have written extensively on the
subject of sanctioning courtroom misconduct. See, e.g., 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (1990); Arthur R. Miller, The
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
3. One commentator has found that attorney's fees have been imposed as sanctions in
96% of the cases finding a violation of Rule 11. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended
Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1333 (1986).
4. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court has recently announced in Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc.' a greatly expanded version of the court's inherent
power, particularly regarding Rule 11.' No longer is this resource
just a "gap-filler." After the Court's decision, a district judge can, in
certain circumstances, rely solely on the court's inherent power to
sanction, even when Rule 11 also applies.
Using Chambers as a point of reference, this comment begins
with an historical sketch of the court's inherent power to sanction,
describing the power's purpose and its application.' This comment
then discusses the origin and development of Rule 11, its purpose,
and its application.9 The problem of overlap and choosing between
the sanctioning tools is then introduced.10 Consequences of endorsing
an expanded version of the inherent power to sanction are analyzed
with respect to the purpose of Rule 11, the requirements of due pro-
cess, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded." Finally, this com-
ment advances several proposals intended to minimize the harmful
effects of the Court's decision and to retain the benefits of the tradi-
tional approach to awarding attorney's fees. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Court's Inherent Power to Sanction
1. The American Rule
Courts may not award attorney's fees as damages to a prevail-
ing party unless authorized by statute or contractual agreement be-
tween the parties.'" This long-held tradition has become known as
6. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
7. The Court also found the bad-faith exception applicable to sanctionable conduct
outside the courtroom. d. at 2132; see also infra notes 40 and 46 and accompanying text.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. has been limited by a recent district court decision finding that a
court's inherent power to assess attorney's fees as sanctions is restricted to litigation before that
court. CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 648, 652 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
This decision would prevent a court from imposing sanctions that require a finding of miscon-
duct upon a party for acts that ocurred entirely before another court in another circuit. Id.
8. See infra notes 13-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 65-121 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 143-205 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 206-28 and accompanying text.
13. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-49 (1975);
F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1974). In contrast, English
courts are free to award attorney's fees as damages without regard to statutory authority. Ar-
thur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-72 (1929); Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's
Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977).
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the American Rule and states that "the prevailing litigant is ordina-
rily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the
loser."" The rule's historical roots reach as far back as the begin-
ning of the United States federal system. 5 In 1853, Congress en-
acted legislation that embraced the spirit of the American Rule and
expressly limited attorney's fees collectible from the losing party to
the amounts stated in the statute.1 6 The 1853 Act remains largely
unchanged in the current United States Code.' 7 The general rule
against fee-shifting continues to be reaffirmed by the United States
Supreme Court."8
2. The Common Law Exceptions
In spite of the American Rule, federal courts have crafted com-
mon law exceptions to the rule against fee-shifting based on their
inherent power to police their judicial proceedings. 9 The implied
14. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247.
15. See, e.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) ("The general
practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to [the award of attorney's fees as damages];
and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the
court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.").
16. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 171, 10 Stat. 161 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920,
1923 (1988)). The Act states in relevant part:
Fees of Attorneys, Solicitors, and Proctors. In a trial before a jury, in civil
and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing in equity or admi-
ralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars ....
In cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury, ten dollars,
and five dollars where a cause is discontinued.
For scire facias and other proceedings on recognizances, five dollars.
For each deposition taken and admitted as evidence in the cause, two dol-
lars and fifty cents.
A compensation of five dollars shall be allowed for the services rendered in
cases removed from a district to a circuit court by writ of error or appeal ....
Id.
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1988).
18. "The 1853 Act was carried forward in the Revised Statutes of 1874 and by the
Judicial Code of 1911. Its substance, without any apparent intent to change the controlling
rules, was also included in the Revised Code of 1948 as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923(a)."
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 255; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765
(1980) ("[Tlhe general rule in federal courts is that a litigant cannot recover counsel fees.");
F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974) (no attorney's fees in the
absence of contractual provision or statute allowing such recovery).
19. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) ("[W]e do not lightly
assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles [such as the scope of a
court's inherent power]."); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("Cer-
tain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution[sl." These implied powers "cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others."); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123,
2132 (1991) (affirming the inherent power of federal courts to police the conduct of the parties
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supervisory powers are "governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."' The 1853
Act does not interfere with judicially created exceptions allowing for
fees in excess of those allowed by statute.21
The three most commonly used exceptions are narrowly tailored
and fall into the categories of the common-fund exception, the willful
disobedience exception, and the bad-faith exception.22 The common-
fund exception enables courts to award attorney's fees to a party
whose litigation efforts "preserv[ed] or recover[ed] a fund for the
benefit of others in addition to himself."2 The common-fund excep-
tion is properly derived not from the -court's inherent power, but
from its historic equity jurisdiction.24 Under the willful disobedience
exception, courts have discretion to shift the entire cost of litigation
appearing before them); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The
inherent powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all
others.' ") (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)); Ex parte Robinson,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) ("The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings .... ");
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) ("[C]ourts of justice are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect and
decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates . . ").
20. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). The scope of the court's inher-
ent power to control the conduct of litigants who appear before it is far-reaching. See, e.g., Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) ("Power to punish for contempt is inher-
ent in all courts."); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) (federal court has the
power to control admission to its bar and punish attorneys who appear before it). When court
orders are disobeyed, the court's power naturally extends to conduct beyond the confines of the
courtroom. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987) ("The underlying
concern that gave rise to the contempt power was not . . . merely the disruption of court
proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether
such disobedience interfered with the conduct at trial."); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)
(court may ban from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial); Link v. Wa-
bash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (court may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to
prosecute); Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (court may dismiss an action under its
inherent power on grounds of forum non conveniens); Universal Oil Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328
U.S. 575 (1946) (court has power to set up an independent investigation to determine whether
it has been a victim of fraud); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
245 (1944) (courts have "the historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten
judgments").
21. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
22. Id. at 257-59.
23. Id. at 257. See generally John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in
Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 850-51 (1975) (prevailing plaintiff should
be awarded fees from the common fund based on restitution principles); John P. Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients' Attorney's Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597
(1974) (discussing the historical development of the common-fund exception from its roots in
restitution principles).
24. Sprague v. Ticonic, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
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to a party who intentionally disobeys a court order. 25 The third ex-
ception and the one on which this comment focuses is the inherent
power to assess attorney's fees when a losing party has "acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' '26 While
Congress has the authority to pass legislation prohibiting use of these
exceptions,' 7 the legislative branch "has not repudiated the judicially
fashioned exceptions to the general rule against allowing substantial
attorneys' fees."2 As long as Congress' acquiescence continues, the
courts will use their judicially created exceptions to sanction abuse of
the judicial process.
3. The Purpose of the Bad-Faith Exception
The purpose of sanctions generally is the improvement of the
judicial process. This improvement can be achieved through punish-
ment, compensation, and deterrence. 9 However, the court's inherent
power under the bad-faith exception is arguably geared toward pun-
25. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (cit-
ing Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923)), cited with ap-
proval in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975)).
26. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quot-
ing F.D. Rich v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). While Alyeska involved bad-faith
conduct on the part of the losing party, sanctions have been extended equally to prevailing
parties who misuse the judicial process. See, e.g., In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.
1985); Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975). Technically, the bad-faith ex-
ception to the American Rule against fee-shifting does not contradict the rule at all. The
American rule prohibits fee-shifting on a substantive basis. That is, the prevailing party does
not also get his or her fees and costs paid by the loser.
The bad-faith exception providing for fee-shifting is procedural, not substantive. Fees are
awarded not based on who wins, but on who abuses the judicial process. This distinction
becomes very important when a federal court sits in diversity and must choose between a state
law that allows for fee-shifting and the federal rule allowing fee-shifting only upon a finding
of bad faith. Under the Erie Doctrine, federal courts defer to state law only when there is
conflict between substantive federal law and substantive state law. See generally Jeffrey A.
Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further SubstancelProcedure Problems
Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PrrT. L. REV 393 (1988). This point was made in Cham-
bers v. NASCO, Inc. when the United States Supreme Court allowed application of the bad-
faith exception to shift fees despite substantive state law to the contrary. 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2137
(1991).
27. Article III of the United States Constitution, supplemented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I, § 8, cl. 18, gives Congress power to establish a system of federal
district and appellate courts and, by implication, to establish procedural rules governing the
judicial proceedings. Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Ena-
bling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 293-94 (1989). Through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress
delegated to the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate uniform rules to govern "practice
and procedure" of the lower federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
28. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975).
29. See generally J.D. Page & Doug Sigel, The Inherent and Express Powers of Courts
to Sanction, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 43, 70-73 (1990).
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ishment and compensation, with deterrence being a helpful by-prod-
uct. The Supreme Court in 1973 indicated that "the underlying ra-
tionale of 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive, and the essential
element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of
'bad faith.' "8 In a later opinion, the Court elaborated further, stat-
ing that the dual purpose of the court's inherent powers is "vindi-
cat[ing] judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions
available for contempt of court and mak[ing] the prevailing party
whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy.""1 Because of
this emphasis on "vindication" and making the party "whole," liti-
gants are subject to greater possible sanctions, monetary or other-
wise, than if deterrence alone were the motivating factor.
4. Chambers v. NASCO and the Bad-Faith Exception
Under the bad-faith exception of Alyeska Pipeline,"2 the Su-
preme Court recently affirmed in Chambers v. NASCO an assess-
ment of nearly one million dollars in attorney fees, along with dis-
barment of the lawyers involved. 8 Sanctions were imposed based on
the court's inherent powers, not on Rule 11 or other applicable
mechanisms. 4 The Court readily found bad faith based on Cham-
bers' and his lawyers' conduct.
Chambers was sued for specific performance of a contract in
which he agreed to sell his Louisiana television and radio communi-
cations business. 5 Under the contractual obligations, Chambers was
required to file the necessary documents requesting a transfer of in-
terest with the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter
FCC).8 Having changed his mind about the deal, Chambers refused
to file the documents with the FCC and attempted to convince
NASCO that the deal was off.3" NASCO responded by taking legal
30. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
31. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
32. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 241 (1975).
33. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 n.5 (1991). Chambers was re-
quired to pay his opponent's entire litigation expense, including fees and costs totaling
$996,644.65. His attorneys were disbarred or suspended for periods ranging from six months
to five years. Id.
34. Id. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy listed a
number of rules and statutes which the district court could have relied to reach all of the
sanctionable conduct. Id. These sanctioning tools included Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
11, 16(f), 26(g), 56(g), and 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). Id.
35. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2128 (1991).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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action, suing Chambers in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana. 8 NASCO prayed for specific per-
formance and a temporary restraining order (hereinafter TRO) to
prevent the sale or encumbrance of the property.89 Before the TRO
hearing, Chambers attempted to place the property beyond the juris-
diction of the court by selling the property to a trust he created with
his sister as trustee and his children as beneficiaries. 0 Chambers
thought he was able to do this because he had discovered that the
NASCO purchase agreement had not been recorded, thereby al-
lowing him to sell the business to a third party.41
After Chambers recorded the purported transfer of his business
to his sister, a skeptical judge called Chambers' attorney to make
sure that the property would remain unencumbered until the hear-
ing.42 The attorney withheld information about the third-party sale
and recordation.' At the hearing, a perturbed judge warned Cham-
bers that his conduct was sanctionable and enjoined him from enter-
ing into a lease-back agreement with the trustee, wherein Chambers
would be able to continue running the business. 4
Despite this warning, Chambers continued with "a series of
meritless motions and pleadings and delaying actions."' 5 The follow-
ing facts are a sampling of Chambers' conduct: He refused to allow
NASCO to inspect the business records pursuant to an injunction; he
subsequently appealed twice but was denied each time for lack of
final judgment; he filed a series of meritless motions and was warned
on each occasion; and he attempted to relocate the equipment and
begin a new business with FCC approval so as to render the contract
meaningless while the court was writing its opinion."6
In the final analysis, the district court held for NASCO, finding
that the deeds conveying the business into a trust were void and in-
operative. 47 Chambers unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the
Fifth Circuit, and the case was remanded to fix the amount of appel-
late sanctions for frivolous appeal and to determine whether further
38. Id. at 2128.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2129.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120,
127 (W.D. La. 1989)).
46. Id. at 2129-30.
47. Id. at 2130.
1993]
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sanctions were appropriate for conduct during the litigation below."8
On remand, the district court found the conduct during the entire
litigation process sanctionable. 9 While the court noted that Rule 11
and other sanctioning tools were applicable, the judge decided that
they were unable to reach all of the bad-faith conduct perpetrated on
the court."' NASCO's entire litigation costs were awarded on the
basis of the court's inherent power." This finding was upheld by the
Fifth Circuit, 52 and the Supreme Court affirmed, in a five-to-four
decision, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it relied solely on its inherent power to sanction Chambers'
bad-faith conduct. 53 The Court held that whenever conduct sanction-
able under Rule 11 is intertwined with conduct that only the inher-
ent power could address, a court in its discretion may safely rely on
its inherent power alone. 4
5. The Subjective Standard
The standard for imposing sanctions is a narrow, subjective one.
The sanctioned litigant must in fact have entertained improper mo-
tives and acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, [or] wantonly. 'M The dis-
trict court in Chambers found three specific categories of bad faith
conduct that combined to perpetrate fraud on the proceedings: (1)
attempts to deprive the court of jurisdiction; (2) filing of false and
frivolous pleadings; and (3) dilatory tactics designed to oppress, har-
ass, and force the opposing party into compliance. 5' Based on this
finding of bad faith and the fact that the misconduct continued from
the genesis of the litigation to its completion, the lower court justified
sanctions of attorney's fees against Chambers in the sum of the ex-
penses paid by NASCO to its attorneys. "7
6. Due Process Requirements
The Court in Chambers warned judges that they must "exercise
caution in invoking [the court's] inherent power, and it must comply
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990).
53. Id.
54. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991).
55. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
56. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2131.
57. Id. at 2130.
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with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the req-
uisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees."'58 This means that attor-
ney's fees will generally not be assessed absent "fair notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the record." 59 Due process under the
court's inherent power is not dictated by rule or statute,6" and there-
fore requirements will vary depending upon the fact pattern61 and
jurisprudential model used.62 In Chambers, the Court found that the
district judge had complied with defendant's right to procedural due
process.6" The fact that the sanctions were not assessed until the end
of litigation did not defeat due process requirements because "Cham-
bers received repeated timely warnings both from NASCO and the
court that his conduct was sanctionable.""'
58. Id. at 2136.
59. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980).
60. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985).
61. Hearing and notice requirements are subject to varied interpretations. Compare,
e.g., Ray A. Scharer & Co. v. Plabell Rubber Prods., Inc., 858 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir. 1988)
(due process at a minimum requires notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard) with
United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1984) (hearing not required if
sanctioned party fails to ask for one) and Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1982)
(hearing not required if court is intimately familiar with the case). The standard of specific
findings of bad faith will also vary. Compare, for example, Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., 112
F.R.D. 632, 639 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (account of plaintiff's bad faith litigation in the record),
affd, 805 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1986) with Baker Indus. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209
(3d Cir. 1985) (sanctions upheld under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 despite the absence of specific find-
ings of bad faith in the record).
62. One commentator has offered three models to explain how courts approach due pro-
cess decisions under their inherent power: The formalist model, the due process model, and the
inherent power model. Each model describes points along a continuum representing a court's
willingness to actively participate in the proceedings. Courts following the formalist model find
their power primarily in the text of statutes and rules. The formalist approach looks only
secondarily to the text of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Next along the continuum is the
Due Process model, which also looks to the text of rules and statutes but which is also open to
the policies and traditions of the Due Process Clause. Farther down the continuum are a
number of inherent power models ranging from weak to strong. The weak inherent power
models are more activist and find their source of power in various constitutional amendments,
statutes, and in the principles of separation of powers and federalism. The strong inherent
power model is the most activist and finds its power inherent in the institution of the courts.
Courts using the strong inherent power model exercise the greatest freedom and expand or
shrink Due Process requirements according to their temperament and situation. Neil H.
Cogan, The Inherent Power and Due Process Models in Conflict: Sanctions in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, 42 Sw. L.J. 1011, 1012-13 (1989).
63. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2138 (1991).
64. Id. at 2139.
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B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
1. The History of Rule 11
The power of the courts to impose sanctions for bad-faith con-
duct is set forth in various provisions of the Federal Rules. Sanctions
under Rule 11 are one example of a codified attempt to address con-
cern over abusive tactics and frivolous litigation.65 Rule 11 was first
adopted in 1937 and represented the unification of Equity Rule 24
relating to signature of counsel and Rule 21 relating to scandalous
matters.66 Application of the rule was designed to strike pleadings
not signed by an attorney of record or signed with an improper pur-
pose.6 7 The signature of the attorney certified "that to the best of
[the attorney's] knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support [the pleading]; and that it is not interposed for
delay." 8 A "wilful violation" 9 of the rule subjects the attorney to
"appropriate disciplinary action."'7 0
2. The 1983 Amendment
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 in response to the need for more
effective deterrence of litigant abuse and misuse of judicial proceed-
ings.7 1 During the years following the rule's amendment, widespread
confusion arose over the application of the rule, the standard re-
quired of attorneys, and the available sanctions.7 1 Some people
feared that imposition of Rule 11 sanctions might chill creative lawy-
ering.73 The Advisory Committee Note to the amendment stated that
"[the] new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions."' 7'
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 made substantial modifica-
65. For excellent general discussions of Rule 11 and its use in federal courtrooms, see
William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181 (1985) and Alan E. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97
YALE L.J. 901 (1988).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 28 U.S.C. § 723c (1937).
67. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 182-83.
68. 28 U.S.C. App. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1982) (amended Apr. 28, 1983).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 196, 198 (1983) [hereinafter
Committee Note].
72. Id.
73. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 184.
74. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 198 (citations omitted).
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tions:"5 (1) the rule's certification requirement extended to every pa-
per filed in court, not just pleadings; (2) the attorney's signature cer-
tified that a reasonable pre-filing inquiry had been conducted; (3)
the claim was well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law,
or by a good-faith argument for the modification of existing law; (4)
papers could not be submitted for an improper purpose, such as to
harass or needlessly increase litigation costs; and (5) upon violation,
the court was under a mandatory obligation to impose sanctions,
which could include reasonable attorney's fees. 6
3. The Objective Standard
While Rule 11 was historically rooted in the courts' equitable
and inherent powers to sanction bad-faith conduct, the amended ver-
75. The full text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 [hereinafter Rule IIl after the
1983 amendment is as follows (new matter is in italics; deleted matter is in strike-out):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an at-
torney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signa-
ture of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief tCre. r. 1va t ... par, it, a ...... it isnot it, p f*,
dely formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant . ... or s h inet to.. t ....... .te
.... .of this rule i t ma be. stice as. s1 an.L . .d False .. .. d the - _ o
a... .. be.. F d.a. .. .. ....... ..... . ........d  If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACricE
T 11.2[2] (1992).
76. For a general discussion of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 see Schwarzer, supra
note 65, at 184-97.
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sion of the rule is not so limited.7 The Advisory Committee Note
specifically states that "[t]he reference in the former text to wilful-
ness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted."'78
Thus, subjective bad faith is no longer the standard for Rule 11 as it
is under the inherent power doctrine .7  To determine whether a
party has violated Rule 11 by submitting a paper for improper mo-
tives, the court does not look at subjective intent alone.8 ° A broader
objective standard applies, resulting in increased use of sanctions.
The court
will infer improper purpose from the record and surrounding cir-
cumstances."1 At least one judge does not lament the change in stan-
dards applicable to litigant conduct:
Were a court to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it
would invite a number of potentially harmful consequences,
such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chil-
ling advocacy. At the same time, some offenders might escape
for lack of sufficient evidence of bad faith. Finally, a bad faith
test would make courts more reluctant to impose sanctions for
fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith finding."'
Sanctions for a violation of the Rule 11 certification requirements
extend to conduct by the client as well.88 But the standard applied to
litigants under Rule 11 is "one of reasonableness under the circum-
77. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 198.
78. Id. at 200.
79. See supra note 55.
80. "[I]n considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court
should take account of the state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge
when the pleading or other paper was signed." Committee Note, supra note 71, at 200 (em-
phasis added).
81. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 196; see also EEOC v. Appleton Elec. Co., 586 F.
Supp. 1108, 1113 (N.D. Il. 1984) (sanctions imposed against employer who resisted an
EEOC subpoena for four years by filing groundless motions); Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready
Assets Trust, 97 F.R.D. 699, 702 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (sanctions imposed when plaintiff per-
sisted in prosecuting claims even after court of appeals rejected them); Viola Sportswear, Inc.,
v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. N.Y. 1983) (sanctions awarded when plaintiff condi-
tioned dismissal of frivolous claim on defendant's abandonment of certain rights).
82. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 196.
83. The 1983 Advisory Committee Note states that "it may be appropriate under the
circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the client." Committee Note, supra note 71,
at 200. Liability, however, does not extend to the firm of which the attorney is a member.
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 124 (1989). The new 1991
proposed Rule 11 amendments take a more liberal position on law firm liability. FED. R. Civ.
P. 11 advisory committee's note, Proposed Rules, 137 F.R.D. 53, 80 (1991) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Rules]. Under the proposed amendments "it may be appropriate to impose a sanction on
the attorney's firm, another member of the firm, or co-counsel, either in addition to or . . .
instead of the person actually making the presentation to the court." (emphasis added).
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stances." '8 4 Accordingly, a client can be held to a reasonable standard
that takes into account a reduced level of skill and responsibility rel-
ative to that of
the attorney.8
4. Purpose of Rule 11
In contrast to the bad-faith exception to the American Rule, the
primary focus of Rule 11 is deterrence and punishment rather than
compensation.8" The 1983 Advisory Committee Note expressly states
that "[t]he word 'sanction' . . . stresses a deterrent orientation in
dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers."8 The
Supreme Court has recently endorsed this position, finding that "the
central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in District
Court and thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure of
the federal courts."88 Therefore, "punishment of a violation of the
signing requirement [is] encouraged by the amended rule."89
5. Crafting Appropriate Sanctions
Rule 11 states that the court "shall9" impose ... an appropriate
84. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 198.
85. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter. Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922
(1991).
86. Courts, however, recognize that all three aspects of sanctions under Rule 11 play a
role: "Rule 11 sanctions are meant to serve several purposes, including (1) deterring future
litigation abuse, (2) punishing present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litigation
abuse, and (4) streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management." White v. General
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990); see American Bar Association, Standards
and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1988),
reprinted in 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 212, 235-
36 (Supp. 1989).
87. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 199-200. The new 1991 proposed Rule 11 con-
tinues to endorse this overarching goal of deterrence: "[Tihe court should select sanctions that
are not more severe than are needed to deter such improper conduct by similarly situated
persons." Proposed Rules, supra note 83, at 80. Before the amendments can be incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they must be approved by the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, the United States Supreme Court, and
Congress. If the changes are approved, they will go into effect in December 1993. Henry J.
Reske, A Kinder, Gentler Rule 11, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 25.
88. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). The American
Bar Association Journal reports that a "recent survey of 800 trial lawyers by Litigation News
showed that 53 percent believed the rule was doing what it was supposed to - make attorneys
stop and think before signing pleadings." Reske, supra note 87 at 25.
89. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 200.
90. The term "shall" is "used in law, regulations, or directives to express what is
mandatory." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2085 (3d ed. 1986).
Courts do not have discretion as to whether or not to apply sanctions. Chambers v. NASCO,
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sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee." 91 Rule 11 is not simply a fee-shifting mecha-
nism.9" While the rule provides for attorney's fees, there is no "enti-
tlement to full compensation on the part of the opposing party."9"
Nevertheless, sanctions could include expenses directly resulting
from the filing of the lawsuit.9" Lower federal courts generally rec-
ognize that determinations regarding Rule 11 monetary damages
should not be made in a vacuum.95 Several important variables must
be factored into the equation to meet the reasonableness and deter-
rence objectives.
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991). See also Committee Notes, supra note 71, at 200 ("IT]he
words 'shall impose' . .. focus the court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for plead-
ing and motion abuses."). Underscoring this duty imposed on the court, the Rule gives the
court the power to sanction on its own motion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. While the focus of this comment is on attorney's fees, Rule 11
leaves the trial judge with discretion to impose "appropriate" sanctions. These may include
"oral or written reprimands and disciplinary proceedings." Untereiner, supra note 65 at 920
n.124. While suspension and disbarment under Rule 11 are theoretically within the discretion
of the trial judge, Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 204, use of these sanctions in this context is
generally disfavored because of heightened due process requirements. See White v. General
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Such decisions are properly made by
those charged with handling attorney disbarment and are generally accompanied by specific
due process provisions to protect the rights of the attorney in question.").
92. It is not surprising that courts have consistently chosen this remedy over others
available, since Rule 11 expressly provides for monetary sanctions. One commentator has
found that 96% of Rule 11 applications result in sanctions of attorney's fees. Melissa L.
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1333 (1986). It is still
important to make the distinction that Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting mechanism driven solely by
goals of compensation.
93. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990). In White, the
district court on remand adjusted its initial award of $172,382.19, based on the prevailing
party's attorney's fees, down to $50,000. White v. General Motors Corp., 139 F.R.D. 178, 183
(D. Kan. 1991). See also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988)
(reasonable attorney's fees "does not necessarily mean actual expenses").
94. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). In
Brandt v. Schal Ass'n, Inc., the appellate court upheld an award of sanctions totalling
$351,664.96 and equalling the amount of defendant's attorneys' fees and expenses. Brandt v.
Schal Ass'n, Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1992). But the court may have been influenced
by the fact that there was a finding of bad faith in addition to a Rule 11 violation. Id. at 647.
The rule that compensation and deterrence are not mutually exclusive may be limited to occas-
sions where the court either finds bad faith or suspects bad faith to be present. However, in
such situations, the court should expressly invoke the bad-faith exception to the American Rule
and invoke its inherent power to shift attorney's fees onto the offending party.
95. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 683; Kunstler v. Britt, 914
F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
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In White v. General Motors Corp.," the Tenth Circuit stated
that courts should consider the following four factors that serve as
limitations on the amount of Rule 11 monetary sanctions: (1) the
reasonableness of the opposing party's attorney fees; (2) the mini-
mum amount needed to deter; (3) the sanctioned party's ability to
pay; and (4) other factors related to the seriousness of the violation..97
A full explanation of these factors was given by the Fourth Circuit
in Kunstler v. Britt." The lower court's award of attorney's fees
under Rule 11 was ruled inappropriate because "the district court
used the Rule to shift fees and compensate the defendants, rather
than to deter improper litigation."" Relying on White, the court of
appeals expounded on the four factors a district court should
consider.100
First, the court must calculate what in fact constitutes reasona-
ble attorney fees in a particular instance.' Only time spent "which
is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evalu-
ated.""0 2 Costs that could have been avoided should not be included
in the calculations: "The injured party has a duty to mitigate costs
by not over[-]staffing, over[-]researching or over[-]discovering clearly
meritless claims."' 03
Second, the sanction should represent the minimum dollar
amount necessary to deter.' 0" In other words, "It is particularly in-
appropriate to use sanctions as a means of driving certain attorneys
out of practice."' 0 5 At the same time, sanctions should not be so
great as to chill creative lawyering and the filing of valid lawsuits.' 0 6
At some point the risk of sanctions can become so great that lawyers
will be less willing to test the boundaries of existing law for fear that
96. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 684-85. Other tests or factors have been suggested. See, e.g., Page & Sigel,
supra note 29, at 75-77; Untereiner,supra note 65, at 917-19. The Supreme Court recently
settled a controversy concerning the standard of review for Rule 11 decisions when it an-
nounced an abuse of discretion standard for both factual and legal conclusions. Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
98. Kunstler v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1607
(1991).
99. Id. at 522.
100. Id. at 522-25. The Eighth Circuit has also adopted the White standard. Pope v.
Federal Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1992).
101. Id. at 523.
102. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523.
103. Id. (quoting White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990)).
104. Id. at 524.
105. Id. (quoting White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir.
1990)).
106. Id.
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such testing will be found improper and sanctionable.
Third, since the purpose of a sanction is deterrence, the court
should consider the ability of the offender to pay.'" 7 This considera-
tion is analogous to a punitive damages situation , in which "the
financial condition of the offender is an appropriate considera-
tion."' 8 When the sanction amount is large, the parties should be
given an opportunity to demonstrate their financial status by submit-
ting affidavits.' 9
Finally, the court may consider other miscellaneous factors." 0
These factors may include the offender's "history, experience, and
ability, the severity of the violation, the degree to which malice or
bad faith contributed to the violation, the risk of chilling the type of
litigation involved, and other factors as deemed appropriate in indi-
vidual circumstances."''
6. Due Process Requirements
Due process generally requires that a litigant be afforded notice
and a fair hearing." 2 Currently, there are no mandatory procedures
for meeting due process requirements under Rule 11.'" The Rule
11 motion itself constitutes notice."" If the issue is whether an attor-
ney made a good-faith argument under existing law, however, the
court may give more specific notice." 5 The timing of the notice re-
quirement is not left entirely to the court's discretion. The Advisory
Committee Notes state that "[a] party seeking sanctions should give
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 685).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 524-25 (quoting White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 685).
112. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elemen-
tary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
113. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) ("No set rule can be
stated to govern all Rule 11 cases; the standard is necessarily flexible to cover varying situa-
tions."). For a good discussion on notice and hearing requirements under Rule 11, see Don-
aldson, 819 F.2d at 1558-61 and Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987).
114. Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560. But see Tom Growney Equip. v. Shelley Irrigation
Dev., 834 F.2d 833, 836 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e distinguish ourselves from other courts
that have found the 'notice' requirement satisfied by the mere presence of the rule.").
115. Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560. If the 1991 proposed amendments to Rule 11 are
approved, a more specific notice requirement will be mandatory, regardless of the circum-
stances. The amendment reads: "A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be served sepa-
rately from other motions or requests, and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
[the section]." Proposed Rules, supra note 83, at 76 (emphasis added).
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notice to the court and the offending party promptly upon discover-
ing a basis for doing so." '116 However, "in the case of pleadings the
sanctions issue .. .normally will be determined at the end of the
litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion is
decided or shortly thereafter.""17
The Advisory Committee warns that satellite litigation"' over
sanctions and separate hearings should be reduced to a bare mini-
mum."' Whether or not a hearing is granted depends on several
factors: (1) the circumstances in general; (2) the severity of the sanc-
tion; (3) the judge's participation in the proceeding, and his knowl-
edge of the facts; and (4) whether further inquiry is needed. 2 ° Cali-
fornia District Court Judge Schwarzer counsels:
Due process requires that the offending party be given notice
and an opportunity to oppose the imposition of sanctions. Be-
cause ordinarily the opposition will consist of an explanation
and justification, it can be adequately presented by memoran-
dum and declarations. Oral argument may be helpful, even if
not required by due process. An evidentiary hearing would not
seem to be necessary and should be avoided, unless the court
must find disputed facts or resolve issues of credibility. This
should rarely be true if, as this article argues the sanctions deci-
sion is based on the face of the record, not on extraneous mat-
ters such as state of mind.' 2'
C. Choosing Between the Bad-Faith Exception and Rule 11
1. The Problem of Overlap
Courts recognize that there is overlap between their inherent
116. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 200.
117. Id. at 200-201.
118. "Satellite litigation results when additional hearings and discovery requests are
needed to determine what level of inquiry to expect of a client, to decide whether a client or
attorney is responsible for the violation, and to apportion sanctions." Note, Factual Frivolity:
Sanctioning Clients Under Rule 11, 65 WASH. L. REv. 939, 955-56 (1990) (author argues
that a combination of judicial discretion and the objective standard poses a small risk of in-
creased satellite litigation as compared to pre-1983 subjective bad faith determinations).
119. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 201. The 1991 proposed amendments to Rule
11 would give more specificity to the hearing requirement: "[The court shall impose an ap-
propriate sanction .. .after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond .... Proposed
Rules, supra note 83, at 76 (emphasis added).
120. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (weighs the factors
suggested by the Advisory Committee Note); see also Committee Note, supra note 71, at 201.
As a general rule, due process considerations are greater as the severity of sanctions increases.
Kunstler v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505, 521-22 (4th Cir. 1990).
121. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 198.
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power to supervise judicial proceedings and statutory authority found
in the rules.' Chambers recognizes this overlap by stating: "The
Court's prior cases have indicated that the inherent power of a court
can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the
same conduct."' 23 The Advisory Committee Notes find that the rule
"build[s] upon and expand[s] the equitable doctrine permitting the
court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose
opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation."''
The question that arises is under what authority the court
should apply sanctions when the misconduct falls under both the
court's inherent power and the Rule. This overlap can arise fre-
quently with regard to the issues discussed in this comment. The
improper motive and harassment prohibited by Rule 11 are similar
to the kind of conduct addressed by the bad-faith exception.' 25 Con-
ceivably, the court could find improper motive under the Rule 11
objective standard and at the same time find elements of bad faith
under the inherent power's subjective test. The inherent power is
"both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanc-
tions. '  It is broader than Rule 11 in that it covers the full range of
litigation abuse. It is narrower than Rule 11 in that it is triggered by
a finding of subjective bad faith.'27
2. The Traditional Approach
Traditionally, courts have viewed their inherent power to sanc-
tion misconduct as displaced by legislation in the form of sanctioning
rules and statutes.'28 This view finds support from at least two
sources. First, the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline reemphasized
that the American Rule prohibits federal courts from awarding at-
torney's fees in the absence of a statute or contract providing an
122. Blue v. Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 534 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In a proper
case, several of the theories can be invoked to justify punishment of the same conduct."). Blue
poses, but does not answer, the question of what standard to apply when attorney's fees are
awarded based on both Rule 11 and the bad-faith exception to the American Rule against fee-
shifting. Id.
123. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2135 (1991).
124. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 198.
125. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133 n.10.
126. Id. at 2134.
127. Id.; see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 922, 932 (1991).
128. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2142
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing courts to ignore applicable statutory provisions and exer-
cise instead inherent power to shift fees "is as illegitimate as it is unprecedented").
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award. 29 Second, the American Rule itself recognizes that Congress
has constitutional responsibility to define the procedural and reme-
dial powers of federal courts. " ° It is the legislative branch that regu-
lates the available costs, sanctions, and fines. " ' Reiterating the tradi-
tional approach, a dissenting Justice Kennedy in Chambers stated
that the "proper exercise of inherent powers requires exhaustion of
express sanctioning provisions.' ' 8 2 The court must first look to sanc-
tions imposed under rules and statutes before resorting to their in-
herent power to sanction bad faith. 8 Under the traditional ap-
proach, inherent power is limited in its application to behavior not
addressed by the rules and therefore found outside of and between
the rules. 3 The court's inherent power acts as a gap-filler and "[a]t
the very least,... must continue to exist to fill in the interstices.' 3 5
3. The Emerging Modern Approach
Some modern courts have expanded the traditional approach by
applying their inherent power to behavior not covered by the rules
and statutes, as well as to behavior covered by those rules. These
courts first apply the rules, but where the rules are silent on details
regarding behavior they purport to cover, the courts then use their
inherent power to impose additional sanctions. Thus, the rules are
still applied, but in contrast with the strict traditional approach, they
are viewed as supplementary to the court's inherent power. This de-
velopment is best illustrated by an example.
The Seventh Circuit used this expanded approach when it af-
firmed a district court order requiring a represented party to attend
a pre-trial conference. " " The district court was unable to use Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a) (hereinafter Rule 16)187 because
129. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
130. See supra note 27; see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941);
McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 317, 318 (1813).
131. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1576
(1990); Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 262. For a comprehensive list of rules and statutes avail-
able to the federal courts see Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2142 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
135. Chambers, 11 S. Ct. at 2134.
136. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989). For
a succinct discussion of this case and the interplay between inherent power and the rules, see
Kelly J. Applegate, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Use of Inherent
Judicial Power within the Limitations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 159 (1991).
137. Rule 16(a) states: "Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may
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this rule only reached attorneys and unrepresented parties.1"8 In-
stead, the court invoked its inherent power to "fill the gap" left by
the rule." 9 Affirmed on appeal after a rehearing, the court of ap-
peals justified its decision by arguing that as long as federal courts do
not contradict the rules, they may exercise procedural authority
outside of the rules based on their inherent power.'4 °
The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers announces a new
and controversial twist to this emerging approach to the inherent
power of the courts. Even though Rule 11 and other statutes ad-
dressed the very same offensive conduct, the Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's order awarding the injured party its attorney's fees based
solely on the bad-faith exception to the American Rule.' 4 ' This
holding greatly expands the reach of a court's inherent power to con-
trol courtroom litigants. Not only does the inherent power work to
sanction conduct found in gaps in and between the rules, but it can
displace the rules themselves in certain circumstances. The Court
ruled:
There is, therefore, nothing in [Rule 11] . . . that warrants a
conclusion that a federal court may not, as a matter of law, re-
sort to its inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction
for bad-faith conduct. This is plainly the case where the conduct
at issue is not covered by [Rule 11]. But neither is a federal
court forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the
inherent power simply because that conduct could also be sanc-
tioned under [Rule 11].142
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Chambers Court's interpretation of the relationship be-
tween Rule 11 and inherent power establishes a dangerous precedent
that can have at least three detrimental effects. Where Rule 11 is
ignored, it (1) threatens to frustrate the purposes underlying the
rule; (2) arguably leaves litigants exposed to less specific notice and
in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear
before it for a conference or conferences before trial .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
138. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, 1421-22 (7th Cir.
1989), reh'g granted, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
139. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 651.
140. Id. See also HMG Property Investors v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d
908, 915 (1st Cir. 1988).
141. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2131-32 (1991).
142. Id. at 2135-36. The Court appears to have adopted the inherent power model of
due process in Chambers. See Cogan, supra note 62 (this article does not address Chambers
specifically, but does give the theoretical basis for the Court's position).
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hearing requirements, potentially leading to costly surprises at the
end of their suit; and (3) leaves an offender without the ability he or
she would have had under Rule 11 to argue that a court must fash-
ion an award based on deterrence and not on automatic compensa-
tion by shifting fees.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Determining Legislative Intent
The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Court to "prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for
cases in the United States district courts . .. and courts of ap-
peals."" Under this authority the Court promulgated the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to "govern the procedure in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature." '44 The Court is
without authority to enact rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."' 5 The Court has stated that it is to "interpret
Rule 11 according to its plain meaning... in light of the scope of the
congressional authorization."" 6 The rules are "as binding as any
statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more
discretion .to disregard the Rule[s'] mandate than they do to disre-
gard constitutional or statutory provisions."' 4
The mandate of Rule 11 is not discretionary by its terms.
Where there is a violation of the rule's requirements, the court
"shall impose ... an appropriate sanction."' 8 The mandatory lan-
guage was added in 1983 and underscores the fact that the intent of
the rulemakers was not discretionary imposition of sanctions. 49 Dis-
senting in the Chambers decision, Justice Kennedy wrote, "The
Rules themselves thus reject the contention that they may be dis-
carded in a court's discretion."' 0
The majority in Chambers posed a textual argument of their
143. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
146. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2453 (1990).
147. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (federal court
could not invoke its inherent power to avoid the harmless error inquiry prescribed by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
149. For the text of Rule 11, see supra note 75.
150. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2144 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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own, arguing that in fact the language of Rule 11 did not indicate a
legislative intent to displace the inherent power.15 1 The majority was
not willing to find legislative intent to abrogate a well established
supervisory power without a clear intention to do so. 15 2 The man-
date of Rule 11 was limited "only to whether a court must impose
sanctions, not to which sanction it must impose.' 5  The only re-
quirement the majority recognized was the imposition of "an appro-
priate sanction.' 4 In support of its position the majority cited the
Advisory Committee Notes, which declared that the rule "build[s]
upon and expand[s] the equitable doctrine permitting the court to
award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose oppo-
nent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation.'
' 5
The 1991 Advisory Committee Notes on Proposed Amendments
to Rule 11 reaffirm the court's inherent power when they state that
the proposed amendments "[d]o not inhibit the court in exercising its
contempt powers.' 5 ' However, this statement should not be inter-
preted to permit the substitution of inherent power for Rule 11 sanc-
tions under the circumstances outlined in Chambers. Rule 11 directs
the court to achieve the effects of punishment and deterrence by re-
quiring imposition of an approprate remedy.' 57 It does not authorize
the court to select its weapon of choice. The effect of allowing such
unguided selection runs counter to legislative intent. Since the effect
of the court's inherent power is largely compensatory and is not de-
terrence-oriented, 5 use of the court's supervisory power to sanction
Rule 11 misconduct arguably does not result in "an appropriate
sanction." A court therefore cannot exercise its inherent powers in
order to impose sanctions of greater or lesser magnitude than what is
appropriate. This interpretation would be consistent with the com-
mittee's mandate for courts to "select sanctions that are not more
severe than are needed to deter such improper conduct by similarly
situated persons. '
151. Id. at 2131-32. Several lower courts have already cited Chambers' reasoning that
Rule 11 does not displace inherent power to sanction. See, e.g., Gillette Foods, Inc. v.
Bayernwald-Fruchteverwertung, 977 F.2d 809, 813 (3d Cir. 1992); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974
F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134.
153. Id. at 2136.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2134-35 (quoting Committee Note, supra note 71, at 198).
156. Proposed Rules, supra note 83, at 82.
157. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 29-31, 86-89 and accompanying text.
159. Proposed Rules, supra note 83, at 80.
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B. Problems with the New Approach
The opinion in Chambers states that whenever conduct sanc-
tionable under Rule 11 is intertwined within conduct that only the
inherent power could address, the court in its discretion may safely
rely on its inherent power alone.160 The Court was motivated by
administrative concerns: "[R]equiring a court first to apply rules and
statutes containing sanctioning provisions to discrete occurrences
before invoking inherent power to address remaining instances of
sanctionable conduct would serve only to foster extensive and need-
less satellite litigation, which is contrary to the aim of the rules
themselves." '161 This aim is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1 (hereinafter Rule 1) which states that the rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action. 1 62
Construing Rule 11 so as to avoid its limitations is appealing
since the Rule could arguably increase a judge's ability to manage
her docket. The harmful consequences to federal civil procedure,
however, would exceed any benefits. The Chambers approach would
encourage the rebirth of at least two dangers the committee sought to
avoid by promulgating the rules: (1) the lack of uniformity; and (2)
the chilling effect on creative lawyering. A fundamental goal of the
rules was to foster uniformity in federal civil procedure. 68 Prior to
1937, the Conformity Act 64 required federal courts to defer to the
procedures of the state in which they sat."6 Since most states had
their own unique sets of rules, litigants in federal courts would be
subjected to a variety of procedures.1 6 After the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937,16' federal courts were subject
to a single set of rules.
Chambers undermines this basic objective of uniform applica-
tion of the rules because litigants will once again be uncertain when
and if Rule 11 will be applied to their conduct. The Court attempts
160. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991).
161. Id. at 2136.
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
163. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex-
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989).
164. Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196 (repealed by adoption of the
Federal Rules in 1934).
165. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (1989).
166. See generally id.
167. The Federal Rules were adopted pursuant to Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1
& 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988)).
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to mitigate this concern by warning that judges "ordinarily should
rely on the rules rather than the inherent power. '"18 However, the
court still has discretion and if "neither the statute nor the rules are
up to the task,"' e the court may overlook the rule and apply its
inherent power to sanction. As the pressure for more administrative
efficiency increases, Rule 11 may even fall into disuse. This would
only compound the deleterious consequences by ensuring "the uncer-
tain development of the meaning and scope of these express sanction-
ing provisions.' 7 One commentator predicts that "if judges turn
from Rule 11 and let it fall into disuse, the message to those inclined
to abuse or misuse the litigation process is clear. Misconduct, once
tolerated, will breed more misconduct and those who might seek re-
lief against abuse will instead resort to it in self-defense." ' 17'
Disuse of Rule 11 after its initial promulgation partially moti-
vated its amendment in 1983.172 Prior to the amendment, judges
were reluctant to impose sanctions because of the subjective nature of
the inquiry and because they did not want to be "perceived as im-
posing [the judges'] personal standards of professionalism on
others. ' 17' This, the judges feared, would have a chilling effect on
creative lawyering.' 74 In 1983, these problems were addressed by
amending the rule, making its application mandatory, and substitut-
ing an objective standard.' 7  A litigant is arguably more confident
about the consequences of advancing a particular claim in court
when sanctions are based on an objective standard rather than on the
uncertainties and surprises of a subjective test.
C. Distorting the Purpose of Rule 11
The effect of the 1983 Amendments to Rule 11 is significantly
altered after Chambers. Instead of an objective standard under Rule
11, the court will apply in specific situations a subjective bad-faith
168. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991). Since Chambers, at least
one district court has cited and heeded this warning, and declined to invoke its inherent power
to sanction bad-faith conduct, finding Rule 11 an adequate sanction. Gibbes v. Rose Hill Plan-
tation Dcv. Co., 794 F. Supp. 1327 (D.S.C. 1992).
169. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136. Rule 11 is not "up to the task" when the sanction-
able conduct lies largely outside the scope of the rule. Id. at 2131.
170. Id. at 2145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 205.
172. Id. at 183.
173. Id. at 184.
174. Id. at 184.
175. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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standard to shift attorney's fees."' This application will reverse the
gains of the 1983 amendments and reintroduce the possibility of chil-
ling creative lawyering. The Advisory Committee Notes specifically
state that "[t]he rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm
or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories."' 7 Not only will
the standard for finding misconduct change under Chambers, but re-
quirements of. due process can assume different and amorphous
contours.
The majority in Chambers offers a general warning that courts
must be careful in administering their inherent power, and they
must adhere to the mandates of due process, both in determining that
bad faith exists and in calculating fees.' The Court does not define
the parameters of due process in this particular situation. Appar-
ently, that task is left to the lower courts to determine on a case-by-
case basis. This deference gives courts much flexibility in any given
situation, since they will "apply inherent power without specific def-
initional or procedural limits."'7 9 Such an approach is part of the
very nature of the application of the court's inherent power.'80
In sharp contrast, "The Federal Rules establish explicit stan-
dards for, and explicit checks against, the exercise of judicial author-
ity."' 8 ' By passing over Rule 11 and invoking the court's inherent
power, judges fundamentally alter norms against which litigants are
measured. Chambers discovered that this unexpected alteration can
occur as late as the end of all litigation. 8 Parties facing sanctions
are suddenly left without the force of due process arguments based
on the specific provisions of Rule 11.
D. Due Process and Determining Sanctionable Misconduct
Rule 11 puts litigants on specific notice that if parties engage in
certain conduct they will be exposed to appropriate sanctions. The
proscribed activity is limited to the filing of groundless, unwarranted,
and vexatious pleadings, motions, and papers.' 83 Only signers of the
documents are held responsible, and signers include both represented
176. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
177. Committee Note, supra note 71, at 199.
178. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991).
179. Id. at 2145.
180. See supra notes 58-64, 112-21 and accompanying text.
181. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2138.
183. See supra notes 75, 76 and text accompanying notes 69-70.
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parties and their attorneys."8 4
If the proposed amendments are accepted, Rule 11 will carry
even more specific notice and hearing requirements than the current
version."8 5 According to proposed Rule 11(c), "[Tlhe court shall im-
pose an appropriate sanction .. .after notice and a reasonable op-
portunity to respond."'"" Furthermore, under proposed Rule
11 (c)(1)(A), requests for sanctions "shall be served separately from
other motions ...and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to
violate [the Rule].' 87 On its own initiative, the court may invoke
Rule 11, "but with the conditions that this be done through a show
cause order, thereby providing the person with notice and an oppor-
tunity to respond."' 88
Today, a litigant who knows he or she may have engaged in
improper filing of court papers will prepare a defense against sanc-
tions based on the due process requirements of Rule 11.89 If Rule
11 is amended as proposed, the litigant's arguments take on added
force, since the operation of the rule is more clearly defined. How-
ever, contrary to the litigant's expectations, the court may avoid his
or her defense based on Rule 11 due process requirements' if the
court finds certification violations intertwined with bad-faith conduct
beyond the scope of the Rule. In this situation, according to Cham-
bers, the court can safely invoke its inherent powers to punish the
litigant.' 90 The litigant now finds himself or herself in a fundamen-
tally different scenario in which the court has much more discretion
to assess whether the requirements of due process have been met."'
As a matter of fact, a judge may require nothing more than what the
Court in Chambers deemed necessary to satisfy due process require-
ments; that is, repeated verbal warnings from the judge and opposing
counsel that the litigant's behavior is sanctionable, and a hearing at
the end of litigation to assess fees." 2
184. See supra note 83.
185. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
186. Proposed Rules, supra note 83, at 76 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 76.
188. Id. at 81.
189. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
190. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991).
191. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
192. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2129, 2139. Federal courts are beginning to tackle the
question left open by Chambers concerning the requirements of due process under the court's
inherent power to assess attorney's fees. See, e.g., Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450, 451, 454 (3d
Cir. 1991) (remanded for district court to consider inherent powers and define due process
requirements). The extent to which state courts may use their inherent powers to assess attor-
ney's fees after Chambers is an open issue as well. See, e.g., Schneider v. Friedman, Collard,
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E. Due Process and Assessing Fees
Other fundamental changes under Chambers occur in assessing
fees to be awarded the injured party. Under Rule 11, attorney's fees
are assessed with the goals of punishment and deterrence in mind.' 93
There is generally no entitlement to full compensation." 4 Therefore,
Rule 11 is not an automatic fee-shifting mechanism by nature. White
v. General Motors 95 and Kunstler v. Britt"" demonstrate that cir-
cuit courts sensitive to the proper use of Rule 11 have developed
specific criteria that district judges should consider in fashioning an
appropriate and reasonable remedy."' These factors include: (1) the
reasonableness of the opposing party's attorney fees; (2) the mini-
mum amount needed to deter; (3) the sanctioned party's ability to
pay; and (4) other factors related to the seriousness of the viola-
tion." 8 Complete fee-shifting without deterrence analysis like that in
White and Kunstler is now unlikely."'
While Rule 11 is designed to deter, the court's inherent power
to punish serves to compensate the injured party.200 Absent are the
specific restraints and procedures found in Rule 11 analysis. Accord-
ingly, the lower court in Chambers did not leave a record of any
consideration regarding questions about reasonableness of NASCO's
expenses or NASCO's efforts to mitigate costs. Along with other
sanctions, Chambers was ordered to pay NASCO's entire litigation
expenses, totaling nearly one million dollars. " '
Despite the fact that sanctions were based upon the district
court's inherent power, Chambers argued to the Supreme Court that
the lower court acted improperly in assessing attorney's fees, basing
his argument solely on cases imposing sanctions under Rule 11.202
Chambers' argument, based on a White-Kunstler analysis, was curi-
ous, of course, since the basis of the sanction was the court's supervi-
sory power. For some unexplained reason, the Court, instead of dis-
Poswall & Virga, 283 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 n.5 (Ct. App. 1991) (the question regarding the
extent to which Chambers applies to California courts is raised but not addressed).
193. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
195. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1990).
196. Kunstler v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990).
197. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
199. Cornelia Honchar Tuite, Sanctions Standards Still Murky, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991,
at 84.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
201. See supra text accompanying note 33.
202. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2138-39. (1991).
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missing Chambers' arguments as inappropriate, answered each of his
arguments and held that the lower court had acted well within its
discretion in fashioning the award."'3 The Court was apparently
flexible and understood that it was confronted with a situation in
which the conduct could have been punished under Rule 1 ."' Since
there was no record of the lower court's deliberations on this particu-
lar matter, the Court substituted its own rationale for justifying the
reasonableness of the award.205
Because the Court did not remand the case to give the lower
court the opportunity to reconsider the appropriateness of the sanc-
tion in light of the White-Kunstler factors, there is no clear directive
from the Supreme Court that, in cases similar to Chambers, judges
must tailor sanctions under their inherent power in accordance with
Rule 11 analysis. Unfortunately, this means that litigants are ex-
posed to potentially much greater sanctions for misconduct than ordi-
narily would be dealt with under Rule 11 analysis.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Course of Action for Parties Facing Sanctions
After Chambers, an important question becomes what a litigant
should argue when the court finds both improper filing and bad-faith
conduct but awards sanctions based on its inherent power to shift
fees rather than its alternative authority to punish derived from Rule
11. There are several courses of action available to a party facing
sanctions.
1. Distinguishing Chambers
The first argument is to distinguish Chambers and urge that
that case is limited to its facts and bears no resemblance to the cur-
rent litigation. The party facing sanctions should stress that "the
court ordinarily should rely on the rules rather than the inherent
power."20 6 This means that passing over an applicable rule in favor
of the court's inherent power should only be done in unusual cir-
cumstances such as those presented in Chambers. The litigant should
203. Id. at 2138.
204. After the Chambers decision, one lower court attempted to explain the Court's
flexibility, suggesting that the Court's rationale was the lack of "extensive authority on the
scope of a court's inherent power to punish a party's disruptive and vexatious litigation activi-
ties . . . ." Brandt v. Schal Ass'n, Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 1992).
205. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
206. Id. at 2136.
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point out that according to the U.S. Supreme Court, a judge only has
discretion when "conduct sanctionable under the rules [is] inter-
twined within conduct that only the inherent power could address..
and all of the litigant's conduct is deemed sanctionable. ' 2107 The
qualified and limited language of the Court seems to provide an op-
portunity in most situations to at least argue that Chambers is not
applicable. That is, the litigant's misconduct is not "intertwined" in
the Court's use of the term, and not all of the litigant's conduct is
sanctionable.
The Court's use of the term "intertwined" in Chambers needs
further analysis, as the meaning of the term is not clear from the
opinion. There are no descriptive adverbs qualifying the meaning of
the verb. The dictionary definition of the word "intertwined" gives
the sense of being twisted together: "[T]o unite by twining one with
another."208 But neither the dictionary nor the Court indicates how
much "twining" is sufficient to satisfy the definition. Does the con-
duct sanctionable under the rules need to be so intertwined within
conduct that only the inherent powers can address that the two are
impossible to separate? Alternatively, must the two types of sanction-
able conduct only be closely, but not permanently, intertwined? If
the Court intends the former definition, then the application of
Chambers will be narrowed even further.
Prior use by the Court of the verb "to intertwine" can shed
some light on this inquiry. In some of the Court's most recent deci-
sions, the term has generally been qualified by an adverb indicating
the degree of "twining" required.20 9 In several of those recent cases,
the Court has found something to be "inextricably intertwined,"' 0
"inseparably intertwined","' and "intricately intertwined. ' 12" After
reciting cases such as these, a litigant can argue that the Court usu-
ally uses the verb in its most restrictive meaning. That is, the use of
the verb "intertwined" in Chambers refers only to situations where
the different kinds of sanctionable conduct are so interlaced as to be
indistinguishable. Only then is the use of the inherent power to sanc-
tion justified, because any attempt by courts to disentangle the
207. Id.
208. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1183 (3d ed. 1986).
209. See, e.g., Connecticut. v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 n.7 (1991); Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1895 (1990) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982)); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct.
1868, 1876 (1990); Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1761 (1990).
210. Atlantic Richfield Co., 110 S. Ct. at 1895.
211. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1761.
212. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 1876.
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strands of conduct "would serve only to foster extensive and needless
satellite litigation."' 3
Of course, the strongest argument for a restrictive interpretation
of "intertwined" is made by looking to see how Justice White, the
author of the majority opinion in Chambers, uses the verb. The best
case is made by citing Connecticut v. Doehr,2" an opinion that he
wrote and handed down on the same day as Chambers.1 5 In both
opinions, Justice White uses "intertwined" without any qualifying
adverbs.
In Chambers, Justice White writes that "conduct sanctionable
under the rules was intertwined within conduct that only the inher-
ent power could address."'" Similarly, in Doehr, Justice White
writes in dicta that "the notice and hearing question, and the bond
question are intertwined and can fairly be considered facets of the
same general issue."117 But in Doehr, Justice White provides a clue
to the meaning of "intertwined." In the very next sentence, an im-
portant qualifier reveals the meaning of his use of the verb "inter-
twined." He writes, "[A] discussion of notice and a hearing cannot
be divorced from consideration of a bond."2 ' Justice White uses "in-
tertwined" in its most restrictive sense. The litigant would draw the
inference that Justice White likely uses the verb in its most restric-
tive sense when appearing without a qualifying adverb. This would
be true particularly when he uses the verb twice in two different
opinions on the same day. Successfully advancing this argument
would further narrow the applicability of Chambers to any fact pat-
tern, because the misconduct must be inseparable in order for the
inherent power to apply.
2. White-Kunstler Still Appropriate
The second argument to make concedes that, if the court does
have discretion to use its inherent powers to shift fees, it still must
consider the White-Kunstler analysis developed for Rule 11 sanc-
tions. The litigant should argue that the Court implicitly adopted
and endorsed this approach when it heard and addressed Chambers'
arguments based on Rule 11 analysis.2" 9 The Court must have done
213. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991).
214. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2116 n.7.
215. Doehr and Chambers were decided on June 6, 1991.
216. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136.
217. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2116 n.7.
218. Id.
219. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2138-39 & n.18.
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so in response to the unusual circumstances presented. That is, both
Rule 11 and inherent power were applicable. Since complete and
automatic fee-shifting is not appropriate for conduct sanctionable
under Rule 11, it should be equally inappropriate and make no dif-
ference when the basis of authority is the court's inherent power.
3. The Court's Membership
Another point of which litigators should always be aware is the
impact on Supreme Court decisions when there is a personnel
change. The confirmation of Justice Thomas to replace Justice Mar-
shall could change how the Court majority views the use of inherent
power to sanction. Since Justice Marshall joined the majority in
Chambers,2"' Justice Thomas becomes a swing vote. As a political
conservative and a President Bush appointee, Justice Thomas could
very likely join the conservative block that dissented in Chambers.
With a majority of the Court's members critical of the decision in
Chambers, the Court may be willing to scale back Chambers' appli-
cation and influence.
B. Courts Invoking Their Supervisory Power
Traditionally, courts have looked to statutory authority before
invoking sanctions consisting of attorney's fees.22 The American
Rule against fee-shifting has only a few judicially created exceptions
based on the court's supervisory power.222 The bad-faith exception
should be invoked only after exhausting all of the possible statutory
provisions.
There are at least two reasons for courts to follow this proce-
dure. First, the intent of Rule 11 was not to allow courts to derive
their authority to sanction from their inherent power. 2 ' Second, the
intent of Rule 11 is to deter specific abuse while encouraging creative
lawyering."24 This goal will be frustrated by use of the inherent
power, which aims primarily to compensate injured parties. If a
court disagrees and follows Chambers, a judge ought to at least mini-
mize the disruption of the parties' expectations and allow the litigant
to offer a White-Kunstler analysis 2 5 in his or her defense. This rea-
220. Id. at 2127.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
222. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
223. See generally Committee Note, supra note 71.
224. Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 184.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 97-111.
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sonable compromise would both simplify the judge's assessment of
sanctions and honor the litigant's expectations.
C. Proposal for Amendment to Rule 11
The Court in Chambers argued that the mandatory language in
Rule 11 referred only to whether a sanction should be given. ' In
the Court's view, Rule 11 did not dictate which sanction applies and
under what basis it should be given."' This argument is based
purely on legislative intent. Therefore, the legislature can overrule
the Court's decision by amending Rule 11 and making its intent
more clear. By amending Rule 11, Congress can remove any doubt
that the rule is intended to displace the court's inherent power over
the matters it addresses. With the proposed amended portion in ital-
ics, Rule 11 would read in pertinent part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. Sanctions imposed for misconduct in violation of this rule
will be based solely on the statutory authority and objectives
derived from this rule, and shall not exceed what is necessary
to deter comparable conduct by parties similarly situated.228
With the proposed modification, courts will clearly be unable to
maintain the position that under Rule 11 they have discretion to look
outside of the authority delegated by the rule to sanction conduct that
falls within the rule. This will reaffirm the boundaries set up in the
U.S. Constitution, which dictates that the function of Congress is to
legislate rules of procedure, and the function of the Judiciary is to
adjudicate within the guidelines set by the rules. The courts will
have to take reasonable time to specifically identify the types of sanc-
tionable conduct and apply the applicable sanction.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has explored the interrelated use of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 and the court's inherent power to assess attor-
226. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
228. Author's proposed modifications are emphasized in italics.
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ney's fees to punish improper certification and court paper filings. As
background for this discussion, the historical development of the two
sources of authority were outlined. The two sanctioning tools were
contrasted to show their differences in application and effect. To
summarize, Rule 11 is primarily designed to deter specific miscon-
duct, while the court's supervisory power seeks to generally compen-
sate the injured party. This comment argued that the court's choice
of authority to impose sanctions would make a significant difference
in the amount of liability imposed.
Traditionally, courts would first exhaust statutory authority to
shift fees before using their supervisory power to sanction behavior
outside the reach of the rules.229 The impact on this tradition by a
recent United States Supreme Court decision was analyzed as it af-
firmed and expanded the modern trend toward relying more heavily
on the court's inherent power to sanction. 8 0 In certain instances
where both Rule 11 and the supervisory power are applicable, the
court may, in its discretion, choose to shift attorney's fees based
solely on its inherent power. Several problems were discussed that
arguably follow from this new tack. Rule 11 could eventually fall
into disuse, thereby frustrating the goal of uniformity that inspired
the rule's inception. In addition, the offending party is exposed to
greater liability under inherent-power sanctions, since these sanc-
tions leave the litigant without the ability to argue for the specific
restraints and procedures provided by Rule 11.
This comment proposed several responses to the Court's recent
decision. Possible arguments that a party facing sanctions could ad-
vance to reduce sanctions under the court's supervisory power were
suggested. In addition, an amendment to Rule 11 was proposed in
order to forbid discretion in the court's choice of authority to impose
sanctions. While concerns over judicial administrative efficiency are
important, they cannot be an excuse for a court circumventing the
specific requirements and goals of statutory provisions.
Daniel H. Fehderau
229. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 141, 142.
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